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Abstract
Environments for decentralized on-line collaboration are now
widespread on the Web, underpinning open-source efforts,
knowledge creation sites including Wikipedia, and other ex-
periments in joint production. When a distributed group
works together in such a setting, the mechanisms they use for
coordination can play an important role in the effectiveness
of the group’s performance.
Here we consider the trade-offs inherent in coordination in
these on-line settings, balancing the benefits to collaboration
with the cost in effort that could be spent in other ways. We
consider two diverse domains that each contain a wide range
of collaborations taking place simultaneously — Wikipedia
and GitHub — allowing us to study how coordination varies
across different projects. We analyze trade-offs in coordina-
tion along two main dimensions, finding similar effects in
both our domains of study: first we show that, in aggregate,
high-status projects on these sites manage the coordination
trade-off at a different level than typical projects; and sec-
ond, we show that projects use a different balance of coor-
dination when they are “crowded,” with relatively small size
but many participants. We also develop a stylized theoretical
model for the cost-benefit trade-off inherent in coordination
and show that it qualitatively matches the trade-offs we ob-
serve between crowdedness and coordination.
Introduction
In many settings on the Web, groups of people who may
have no off-line associations with one another come together
around a project-oriented site that supports remote interac-
tion, discussion, and the production of a shared work prod-
uct. This style of highly decentralized collaboration — the
participants are geographically dispersed and may not inter-
act with each other outside the context of the site — is the
driving force behind a range of large open-source projects
hosted on sites such as GitHub, as well as knowledge cre-
ations sites including Wikipedia and recent experiments in
massively collaborative problem-solving.
One of the crucial questions that emerges, as these forms
of interaction become increasingly influential, is to under-
stand what makes them effective at a structural level, and to
characterize the properties associated with better outcomes.
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To address this question, we draw on a conceptual frame-
work that has proven powerful in off-line domains — an-
alyzing the effectiveness of teams through their coordina-
tion mechanisms. These mechanisms broadly include the set
of practices that help a team organize its collaboration on a
task, for dividing up shared work, setting intermediate goals,
and resolving disagreements (Barnard 1968; Cooper 1980;
Foushee 1982; Helmreich et al. 1986; Malone and Crowston
1990; Faraj and Sproull 2000).
The Present Work: Trade-Offs in Coordination. A fun-
damental property of coordination is the cost-benefit trade-
off that it entails. Coordination is beneficial, but it comes
at a cost — the work that team members put into coor-
dination could be used on the substance of the project it-
self (Becker and Murphy 1994; Entin and Serfaty 1999;
Kittur, Lee, and Kraut 2009; MacMillan, Entin, and Serfaty
2004). Referring to the communication overhead inherent in
coordination, Macmillan et al. write,
“Because communication is essential to team perfor-
mance, effective team cognition has a communication
overhead associated with the exchange of information
among team members. Communication requires both
time and cognitive resources, and, to the extent that
communication can be made less necessary or more
efficient, team performance can benefit as a result”
(MacMillan, Entin, and Serfaty 2004).
Our understanding of this cost-benefit trade-off comes
largely from the study of relatively small face-to-face teams,
as in the research noted above. But the trade-offs involved
in coordination are equally or more pronounced in on-line
domains due to the limited ability of on-line teams to rely
on less costly implicit coordination mechanisms (Entin and
Serfaty 1999; Kittur, Lee, and Kraut 2009; Salas, Stout,
and Cannon-Bowers 1994; Wang et al. 1991), which of-
ten require shared mental models that are difficult to main-
tain on-line (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Converse 1990;
Wittenbaum, Stasser, and Merry 1996).
These trade-offs have clear implications for the design of
these systems. There is thus an opportunity to combine the
work in the organizational literature on coordination and its
consequences for performance with the long line of work
on coordination and its uses in on-line domains (Kittur and
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Kraut 2008; Kittur, Lee, and Kraut 2009; Kittur et al. 2007b;
Krieger, Stark, and Klemmer 2009; Malone and Crowston
1990) and to evaluate the findings in the context of some of
the most active on-line collaborative settings.
Research Questions for Coordination. An important
question in the literature on off-line domains has been to
understand the possible levels of coordination that balance
the trade-off between cost overhead and performance gains,
leading to the best team and individual performance. When
we move to the context of large on-line projects, how do
such projects manage this trade-off, and can we identify
principles in how this balance is managed?
We approach these questions both through the develop-
ment of an analytical framework and through the study of
large on-line datasets. In particular, we focus on Wikipedia
articles and GitHub projects as two rich collaborative do-
mains that share some essential abstract properties:
• They each contain projects in which there is a primary
work product and also a channel for coordination among
members of the project team.
• Participation in projects has an interlocking structure, in
the sense that the participants in one project may also be
involved in others.
• Certain projects may have a higher level of status or visi-
bility than others; on Wikipedia certain articles are fea-
tured, and on GitHub certain projects can have a non-
trivial number of watchers.
These ingredients also relate in interesting ways to the co-
ordination framework proposed by Malone and Crowston
(Malone and Crowston 1990), who identify goals, activities,
actors, and interdependencies as the general components of
coordination.
We organize our work around two central trade-offs in co-
ordination:
• Do high-status projects manage the coordination trade-off
differently from typical projects?
• How does coordination relate to a project’s team composi-
tion and crowdedness — in particular, the amount of work
produced relative to the number of members in the team?
In addition to the data analysis supporting these two ques-
tions, we develop a mathematical model to capture the bal-
ance of costs and benefits in coordination abstractly.
It is important to note a few features of our approach.
First, we organize our work around the aggregate analysis
of large datasets, and our findings are correspondingly ori-
ented toward trade-offs at this cumulative level. Our inves-
tigation is thus complementary to more fine-grained studies
of individual projects and the specifics of their coordination
strategies. Second, while our analysis is performed on two
particular domains — Wikipedia and GitHub — we seek to
articulate a framework that can be applied to on-line collab-
oration across many contexts. With this in mind, we develop
the core components of our approach — projects and shared
work, coordination mechanisms, interaction across projects,
and measures of status and visibility — at a general level,
and illustrate how they can be applied across these two dif-
ferent contexts to yield closely related findings. We hope
through this alignment of common structure to suggest a set
of principles that can be used more broadly.
Finally, we believe that our analysis of coordination raises
a number of possible suggestions for design, as we discuss
further in what follows. Applications supporting collabora-
tion increasingly seek to steer groups of users toward ef-
fective interaction, and coordination mechanisms can be a
powerful component of this process. But the trade-offs in-
herent in coordination make clear that it can be a non-trivial
problem to determine whether a system should be guiding a
group toward more or less coordination in a given situation.
By understanding how levels of coordination naturally vary
with the visibility of a project and the crowdedness of the
setting, we can establish principles by which coordination
mechanisms can be tuned based on the underlying context.
Summary of Results. We establish results on the trade-
offs in coordination for our main questions described above.
We first show that there are significant aggregate differ-
ences in the way that coordination is used in the higher-
status projects on both Wikipedia and GitHub, relative to the
use of coordination in typical projects. This suggests that
properties related to coordination can be relevant to ques-
tions of performance and visibility in our on-line setting. For
Wikipedia, where the set of participants in a single project is
often larger and more diverse, we delve further into the ques-
tion by looking at how much the effort and coordination is
concentrated on a small set of the most active participants —
this connects to an argument due to Kittur and Kraut, who
posit that a balance of effort in on-line tasks in which a few
participants do most of the work can correspond to a form
of implicit coordination (Kittur and Kraut 2008).
We then explore the relationship between coordination
and the composition of the project. We find that additional
coordination is most useful when there are many team mem-
bers and the task is small, resulting in a crowded environ-
ment; it is most wasteful when the number of team members
is small and the size of the task is large. As with our results
on high-status projects, our findings here too are consistent
in Wikipedia and GitHub.
We supplement this analysis with a formal model for
studying the trade-off between the cost of explicit coordina-
tion and the benefits it brings to a project. The predictions of
the model also suggest that crowdedness is a key parameter
in the coordination trade-off.
Wikipedia Data
In this section and the next, we describe our two datasets —
Wikipedia and GitHub. We begin with Wikipedia, which is
the larger and more complex of the two, and the one where
we are in some cases able to compute correspondingly more
complex functions of the data.
For our purposes, each Wikipedia article constitutes a
project that is produced by the set of users who edit it.
Wikipedia captures many of the basic features that one sees
in on-line collaboration more generally, and for our purposes
it also exhibits three desirable properties. First, since each
article constitutes a project with its own internal life-cycle,
we can observe the history of many projects in a common
environment, exploring sources of variation among them.
Second, Wikipedia contains explicit markers of success and
failure for projects, including recognition of certain highly
successful articles. Finally, Wikipedia has well-developed
mechanisms for explicit coordination, along with extensive
records of coordination for each article (Viegas et al. 2007;
Keegan, Gergle, and Contractor 2012). Our data contains
approximately 3.4 million articles, each with a discussion
page. This corresponds to the entire edit history of English
Wikipedia up to April of 2007, developed as a resource by
Crandall et al (Crandall et al. 2008).
We now describe how the basic ingredients of our frame-
work manifest themselves on Wikipedia: we first consider
coordination mechanisms, and then measures for the status
and visibility of articles.
Coordination Mechanisms on Wikipedia. We look at
two kinds of interactions to measure coordination in
Wikipedia: (i) discussion edits, and (ii) comments left on ar-
ticle edits. Each article on Wikipedia has a discussion page
that is used to discuss issues related to the editing of the ar-
ticle such as planning, resolving arguments, and enforcing
conventions (Viegas et al. 2007). We use the number of edits
to discussion pages as a measure of how much effort editors
spend explicitly coordinating. There is significant variation
across articles in the amount of discussion-page editing and
in aggregate we will see that the variation points to overall
differences across different types of articles.
There is a second widely-used form of coordination:
When a user edits a Wikipedia article, she has the option of
including a comment where she can briefly explain the na-
ture of the edit. Leaving comments is often helpful for other
editors because the comments allow them to easily identify
the kinds of edits other users have contributed. Comments
are similar to discussion-page edits in that editors use them
to communicate about the editing of the article, but in con-
trast with discussion edits, comments are much terser and
thus tend to explain the nature of an edit without long dis-
cussions. In this sense, we can think of comments as lying
somewhere on the spectrum between explicit and implicit
coordination, and more implicit than discussion-page edits.
In some of the analysis we will consider both of these
coordination mechanisms, but at other points we will focus
on discussion edits, since they are the mechanism that allows
for explicit coordination, including the ability to engage in
back-and-forth interaction between multiple participants.
Use of Discussion Pages and Comments in Wikipedia.
While edit comments and discussion pages are meant to fa-
cilitate the collaboration among Wikipedia editors to write
high-quality articles, people can use these tools for any pur-
pose. For example, as is often the case on the Web, it is pos-
sible that discussion pages and comment could be used for
spam or other unintended purposes. If this were the case,
measuring coordination by the number of discussion edits
and comments would be misleading. To address this issue
and to further understand how people use discussion pages
and comments, we read a small random sample of comments
and discussion sections from our data and manually catego-
rize them according to their purpose.
Using a set of 100 randomly selected comments, we first
construct a set of categories of purposes. Then, we sample
a new set of 100 randomly selected comments and organize
them into the determined categories. We use the same pro-
cedure to categorize a randomly selected section from 100
discussion pages. Tables 1 and 2 show the categories and the
number of examples in each category for comments and dis-
cussion pages, respectively. We observe that the majority of
the sampled comments and discussions are directly related
to the writing of the article. Any comment or discussion that
was not relevant to the editing of the article was placed in
the ”Other” category. Out of the 100 categorized comments
and discussions, only 11 and 6 fell in the ”Other” category.
This analysis suggests that edit comments and discussion
pages are indeed mostly used by editors to coordinate their
collaboration on Wikipedia. Having established that these
tools seem to be employed to facilitate coordination, we use
the number of comments and discussion edits as a proxy for
how much explicit coordination the editors perform.
Category Num
Mentions section 52
Reverted edit 14
Minor edit 19
Added content 14
Removed content 7
Correction 2
Mentions other users 14
Other 11
Table 1: Categories of Wikipedia edit comments and num-
ber of examples in each category. Categories are based on a
random sample of 100 comments. Comments can belong to
more than one category.
Featured Articles. We now discuss a natural status mea-
sure for articles on Wikipedia. The Wikipedia community
chooses an article to feature every day through a peer re-
view process1, and according to their guidelines, such arti-
cles among the very best in terms of professional standards
of writing, presentation, and sourcing2.
We are interested in comparing coordination practices be-
tween highly successful articles and average articles. While
every measure of success includes particular idiosyncrasies
and potential biases, we believe that using the featured-
article designation as a success measure has a number of
clear advantages. In particular, rather than defining an ad
hoc success measure ourselves, the set of featured articles
1See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Peer review for a
description of Wikipedia’s peer review process.
2See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Featured article criteria
for a description of the attributes a featured article must have.
Category Num
Justify Text edit 14Change metadata 4
Suggest Action
Specific text edit 9
Add content 13
Remove content 4
Change metadata 7
References Provide 4Request 16
Question On article’s topic 8On Wikipedia conventions 5
Copyright issues 8
Dispute claim in article 12
General discussion about article’s direction 8
Other 6
Table 2: Categories of Wikipedia discussion page sections
and number of examples in each category. Categories are
based on a random sample of 100 discussion pages. Discus-
sions can belong to more than one category.
is a clear success measure that Wikipedia’s own community
has defined. This has the advantage that our success measure
is likely to be compatible with the standards and goals of
Wikipedia editors, and it is something that produces incen-
tives among editors. It is certainly true that many very good
articles are never featured, but the existence of the designa-
tion allows us to define a concrete and very high standard of
success for an article: whether it has been featured or not.
GitHub Data
GitHub is a Git repository service used by millions of
people to collaborate on open source software projects.
Even though GitHub is smaller and more specialized than
Wikipedia, it also exhibits the properties that make it a use-
ful testbed for coordination in decentralized collaboration.
We use data obtained from GitHub Archive3, which pro-
vides a record of various aspects of all public repositories.
From these data we are able to capture specific metrics of a
project’s visibility, size, and amount of coordination among
collaborators. Our data contains all public projects that were
actively developed during a three month period starting in
May of 2012, which consists of about 300,000 projects. As
with Wikipedia, we discuss how to develop measures of co-
ordination and status for GitHub projects.
Coordination Mechanisms on GitHub. When a user
commits changes to a repository, others users have the op-
tion of making comments or asking questions by issuing a
commit comment. This feature allows collaborators to dis-
cuss contributions and provide feedback. We use commit
comments to measure coordination on GitHub to understand
how people use comments on GitHub, we manually cate-
gorize a small sample of comments. We follow the same
methodology we use to categorize Wikipedia comments.
3http://www.githubarchive.org/
Table 3 shows the categories and the number of examples
in each category. We observe that commit comments are
largely used to discuss issues directly related to the project,
and hence serve as a reasonable measure of coordination.
Category Num
Coding suggestion 48
Code explanation by author 3
Showing appreciation for other’s work 15
Reporting bug 13
Question about other’s code 19
General programming question 4
Expressing disapproval of other’s work 7
Other 15
Table 3: Categories of GitHub comments and number of ex-
amples in each category. Categories are based on a random
sample of 100 comments. Comments can belong to more
than one category.
GitHub Watchers. In GitHub, users have the option of
watching repositories they are interested in. During the time
period we are analyzing, watching a repository was a way
bookmarking projects of interest4. Since GitHub is mainly
used to develop open source software and we only consider
public projects, it is reasonable to assume that having many
watchers signals high visibility. Hence, we use the number
of watchers a project has as continuous measure of status.
Having now articulated how the basic ingredients of our
framework are reflected in both the Wikipedia and GitHub,
we turn to our central questions in order.
Coordination in High-Status Projects
In this section we investigate how the amount of coordina-
tion varies with the status of a project. For Wikipedia, we
compare coordination in featured and non-featured articles,
and in GitHub we measure coordination as a function of the
project’s number of watchers.
As noted in the introduction, we interpret our analysis via
the trade-off between the costs and benefits of explicit co-
ordination (MacMillan, Entin, and Serfaty 2004): While a
highly coordinated team of collaborators has the advantage
that it can split tasks, resolve disagreements, and set goals
effectively, a team that works with little coordinating has the
advantage that it spends all its efforts working on the task
rather communicating with team members.
The x-Core. It is known that in many on-line settings, a
few users are responsible for much of the content of the site
(Kittur and Kraut 2008; Kittur et al. 2007a). We call this
small group of users the core of the project. More concretely,
we define the x-core of a project to be the smallest set of
users that account for an x fraction of all the work; these are
the most active participants on the project. As we increase x,
4See https://developer.github.com/changes/2012-9-5-watcher-
api/
the x-core gets larger as more participants get included, and
finally the 1-core is the set of all participants. We define the
size of a project’s x-core as the number of users it contains.
The x-core can be defined for any collaborative project,
but we focus here on its application to Wikipedia, because
the projects there are large enough to show substantial varia-
tion as we range over possible values of x. By contrast, most
of the GitHub projects we analyze are smaller and more fo-
cused, and since the x-core analysis is correspondingly less
informative, we do not apply it in GitHub.
On Wikipedia, a natural question is whether featured ar-
ticles tend to have a larger or smaller x-core size than non-
featured articles. Measuring work by the number of edits,
we compute the fraction of editors that belong to the x-core
of each featured article, which captures the extent to which
a small fraction of individuals are doing most of the work.
Figure 1 shows the median fraction of editors in the ar-
ticle’s x-core for different values of x. Throughout the pa-
per, statistical significance of the difference in medians us-
ing the Mann-Whitney U test (Kruskal 1957) is indicated
by the color of the dots: black (p-val < .001), green (p-val
< .01), yellow (p-val < .05). We observe that featured ar-
ticles have significantly smaller core sizes for most values
of x. Having few editors in the core may be beneficial for
an article by making coordination among the core easier. In
the same spirit as this result, Kittur and Kraut found that
Wikipedia articles benefit from having many editors as long
as a few editors are responsible for most of the edits (Kit-
tur and Kraut 2008). They propose that organizing in such
a way that a few editors are responsible for most edits is an
implicit form of coordination.
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Figure 1: Median fraction of editors in x-core for featured
articles (red) and non-featured articles (blue).
Coordination in Featured Wikipedia Articles. We now
study how Wikipedia editors make use of explicit coordina-
tion mechanisms to interact with each other, and how this
operates differently in featured and non-featured articles. In
this analysis, we consider the x-core for each x; this lets
us consider both the full article (when x = 1), as well as
whether coordination mechanisms are differentially used by
the most active editors (for smaller values of x).
We would like to compare featured and non-featured ar-
ticles, focusing on potential differences in coordination be-
havior. We do this by constructing a comparison set — a
set of featured articles and a set of non-featured articles over
which we can compare aggregate properties. Given the a pri-
ori differences between featured and non-featured articles,
such a comparison set needs to be constructed carefully so
that the contrasts we identify are not simply consequences
of surface-level differences that we already understand.
In particular, we control for three different features in set-
ting up the comparison set. First is the volume of edits: fea-
tured articles tend to have a lot of editing activity before they
are featured, and once they are featured they attract even
more attention than they would get under normal circum-
stances. Hence, when we compare editing behavior in fea-
tured and non-featured articles, we control for the number
of edits. Second, we control for the stage of development
of the article at the time of its last recorded edit. Since ar-
ticles on Wikipedia are created every day, our data contains
well established articles that have been edited thousands of
times as well as newer ones that have only been edited tens
of times. Finally, a third factor we control for is the stage of
Wikipedia as a whole at the time when the edits to an article
were done. Conventions among Wikipedia editors gradually
change over time, and the behavior of editors can be system-
atically affected by new conventions or features added on
Wikipedia. Thus, our comparison set of featured and non-
featured articles comprises roughly the same distribution of
time points from the history of Wikipedia.
In summary, we construct two sets of articles with roughly
the same distribution of edits that were generated at roughly
the same time period — one of featured articles and one of
non-featured articles. In the Appendix we provide the full
details on exactly how this comparison set is constructed.
Let’s now look separately at how discussion pages and
comments are used by featured and non-featured articles,
considering the x-core for multiple values of x. Given the
coordination trade-off we discussed above, it is unclear
whether featured articles should display higher or lower use
of these coordination mechanisms.
Figures 2(a) and 2(c) show that for all values of x, the x-
core produces more discussion edits and comments in fea-
tured articles than non-featured articles. Recall that our set
of non-featured articles is constructed to mirror the activity
level of the featured articles as measured by article edits, so
the comparison in Figures 2(a) and 2(c) is effectively saying
that there is more coordination per edit in featured articles.
A distinct but related question is to consider which of the
editors on an article are accounting for the coordination ac-
tivity. In particular, there are two natural hypotheses: that
the most active editors are overrepresented in the discussion
as they coordinate; or, alternately, that the less active editors
are overrepresented in the discussion while their more active
counterparts do the work of writing the article itself.
To investigate this, we define d(x) (respectively c(x)) to
be the fraction of discussion-page edits (respectively com-
ments) created by editors in the x-core, and we plot the dif-
ferences d(x)− x and c(x)− x as functions of x. Note that
d(1)− 1 = c(1)− 1 = 0 by definition, and in the event that
every editor contributed to the discussion pages and com-
ments in proportion to their article editing activity, we would
have d(x)− x = c(x)− x = 0 for all x.
In Figures 2(b) and 2(d) we show plots of d(x) − x and
c(x)−x respectively, averaged separately over featured and
non-featured articles. The fact that these functions are posi-
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(b) Median value of d(x)−x vs.
x. d(x) is the faction of discus-
sion edits contributed by x-core
editors.
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(c) Median number of com-
ments by x-core vs. x
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vs. x. c(x) is the faction of com-
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Figure 2: Differences in the use of comments and discussion pages among editors of featured (red) and non-featured (blue)
articles.
tive over all x < 1 shows that the more active editors (those
who belong to the x-core for small x) are in fact overrep-
resented in these coordination mechanisms. Moreover, this
overrepresentation is particularly pronounced for the fea-
tured articles, again suggesting some of the distinctive ways
in which featured articles use coordination. There is also
an interesting contrast between discussion-page edits and
comments: c(x) − x is higher for featured articles over all
x < 1, while d(x)−x is higher for featured articles only for
x < 1/2. It would be interesting to further explore how this
difference relates to the lighter-weight nature of comments
relative to discussion-page edits.
Coordination in Highly-Watched Github Projects. We
now look at the relationship between coordination and sta-
tus on GitHub, keeping our discussion more brief for this
dataset. Since our measure of status in GitHub is continuous,
rather than comparing two sets of projects, we look at how
the number of comments per commit changes with number
of watchers. Figure 3(a) shows that the number of comment
per commit increases with number of watchers — this trend
points in the same direction as our Wikipedia analysis, with
higher-visibility projects using more coordination overall.
It is natural to ask whether the number of watchers is serv-
ing purely as a proxy for the number of commits, but as Fig-
ure 3(b) illustrates, the number of comments per commit is
roughly constant as a function of the number of commits.
Thus the trend we are seeing is not due to the number of
commits, and this argues for the relationship between visi-
bility (number of watchers) and the level of coordination.
We thus see that both GitHub projects and Wikipedia ar-
ticles with higher status spend more effort coordinating. As
noted earlier, this suggests the implication that projects with
higher visibility may be usefully guided in the direction of
greater levels of coordination relative to typical projects.
Coordination in Crowded Environments
Having established that projects with different status and
visibility in Wikipedia and GitHub can exhibit signifi-
cant aggregate differences in their use of coordination, we
now explore the differences in coordination among projects
with different team composition. Our basic intuition is that
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Figure 3: Comments as a function of the number of watchers
(GitHub).
projects that involve a larger number of users require more
coordination than smaller teams. However, since our data
sets include projects that output different amounts of work,
the size of a team should be considered in relation to the
amount of work it produces. For a project with a fixed
amount of work produced, we expect that the amount of co-
ordination will increase with team size. Furthermore, for a
project with a fixed team size, we expect that the amount of
coordination will decrease with amount of work produced.
In summary, our hypothesis is that more crowded projects
(large team size and low production) will require more coor-
dination than less crowded ones. This is because as projects
become crowded by users, but the amount of work available
does not increase accordingly, users will lose the ability to
work separately on independent tasks, and more communi-
cation will be necessary to coordinate multiple users work-
ing on the same task. We now test our hypothesis on our data
sets.
Crowdedness in Wikipedia. We would now like to com-
pare our hypothesis with what we observe in Wikipedia. We
first need to define measures for the project’s amount of
work produced, number of users, and amount of coordina-
tion. To define reasonable representations of these parame-
ters we take each Wikipedia article a and consider the users
Ua who have made at least one edit to the article and one edit
to the discussion page. These are users who have demon-
strated awareness of the existence of the article’s discussion
page. Since articles in our data are at different stages, we
consider a constant number of initial edits to measure the
number of editors interested in the article and levels of co-
ordination. We record the timestamp Ta when the 100th edit
by users in Ua was made. We let Sa be the set of users in
Ua who contributed at least one of the first 100 edits. The
Sa parameter represents the size of the team as it existed at
a fixed point in time. We let Da be the number of discussion
edits made before time Ta. The Da parameter represents the
amount of coordination exhibited by the team. Here, we only
consider discussion edits since they are the more explicit co-
ordination mechanism. Finally, we let Na be the eventual
size of the article in bytes, which represents the amount of
work produced by the editors.
Figure 4(a) depicts the amount of coordination log(Da)
in an article of size Na and Ua editors. It is drawn as a heat
map, with the color corresponding to the value of log(Da).
Furthermore, in figure 4(b), we split articles into four cate-
gories depending on whether — relative to the median arti-
cle — they have a lower or higher number of bytes (Na) and
a lower or higher number of editors (Sa). We compare the
number of discussion edits (Da) and the number of discus-
sion edits per editor (DaSa ) among the four categories.
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show the general trend we hypothe-
sized. The amount of coordination, measured by the number
of discussion edits and discussion edits per editor, increases
with the number of editors and decreases with the size of the
article. Articles that are crowded with many users and low
production exhibit the most coordination.
Crowdedness in GitHub. We now explore the role of
crowdedness in the coordination of GitHub projects. We
measure amount of work produced, number of users, and
amount of coordination analogously to how we measured
them for Wikipedia, and then perform an analogous investi-
gation of the relationship. For each GitHub project p we let
Up be the users who committed at least once and contributed
at least one comment. We record the timestamp Tp when the
100th commit by users in Up was made. We let Sp be the set
of users in Up who contributed at least one of the first 100
commits. We let Cp be the number of comments made be-
fore Tp. Finally, we letNp be the eventual size of the project
measured by the total number of commits in the full history
of the project. We use Np as the amount of work produced,
Sp as the number of users, and log(Cp) as the “amount of
coordination.”
Since the GitHub data set is much smaller than Wikipedia,
in order to see the change in coordination with project size
and number of users, we split the projects into 100 bins by
splitting the number of users (Sp) and the size of the projects
(Np) into 10 bins by percentile. We then measure the amount
of coordination (log(Cp)) within each bin. Figure 5(a) shows
a heat map of coordination log(Cp) as a function of num-
ber of users (Sp) and the size of the projects (Np). To ob-
serve a numerical representation of the trend, we also split
the projects into four categories depending on whether they
have low or high number of users and project size, relative
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Figure 4: Amount of coordination in Wikipedia articles of
different composition.
to the median. Figure 5(b) shows the median values of Dp,
Dp
Sp
, and the number of projects in each category.
We find that the trend is similar to the one observed in
Wikipedia. As projects become more crowded with many
users and small size, users tend to coordinate more. Overall,
the fact that coordination and crowdedness align closely in
both domains raises a further potential implication for de-
sign — to recognize projects that are becoming increasingly
crowded, and to correspondingly guide groups toward coor-
dination resources as this is occurring.
Modeling Coordination and Crowdednes
We now develop a simple theoretical model of coordina-
tion, so that we can study the cost-benefit trade-off in co-
ordination at a more formal level. The model is highly styl-
ized to reduce this trade-off to its basic essence. The benefit
of working with a concrete stylized model is that by strip-
ping away much of the complexity of the coordination pro-
cess that is specific to Wikipedia and GitHub, we can high-
light how certain trade-offs depend only on a set of sim-
ple assumptions that are present in other domains outside
of Wikipedia and GitHub. We find that the model accom-
plishes this – from the analysis of the model, we identify the
relationship between crowdedness and coordination, which
matches our original hypothesis and the effects we found in
Wikipedia and GitHub.
General Setting for the Model. We begin by modeling
the costs and benefits of coordination in a stylized setting
that represents a team’s collaboration. The costs result from
the fact that time spent on coordination does not directly ad-
vance the project itself. The benefits will be based on divid-
ing up the work without redundancy — in the absence of
coordination, there is the danger that two people will try to
do the same step in the project simultaneously, resulting in
a loss in efficiency. In the context of GitHub and Wikipedia,
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ferent composition.
we can think of this model as capturing the way in which
coordination is particularly important when two users are
working on the same section of an article or the same part
of a program. Without coordination or discussion, users who
disagree on the outcome often engage in “edit wars,” undo-
ing each other’s work (Vie´gas, Wattenberg, and Dave 2004).
As discussed above, our model is not designed to cap-
ture all the nuances encountered in contexts as complex as
Wikipedia and GitHub. Indeed, our goal is in a sense the op-
posite, to find the simplest formulation of a model in which
the inherent trade-off between coordination and efficiency
emerges from the basic properties of the model.
The structure of our model is as follows. There is a project
with N parts that need to be finished. Each part starts in the
unfinished state, and requires one unit of work; a part tran-
sitions from the unfinished to the finished state when a user
works on it. A set of E users work on the project. In a sin-
gle step, a user contributes a unit of work to one part. If the
part is currently unfinished, then it becomes finished. If the
part the user worked on was already in the finished state, the
situation is more subtle, reflecting the collision between two
users. The new contribution has no effect with probability
1 − α; and with probability α it in fact has a negative ef-
fect, clashing with the previous contribution and returning it
to the unfinished state. This captures the idea noted above,
that when two people work on the same task, it can create
additional work as the differences are resolved.
Users arrive sequentially and can either coordinate with
previous users before contributing, or contribute without co-
ordinating. Specifically, each user is allowed to perform two
actions, selected in one of the following two ways:
• Coordinate: If the user coordinates, she uses her first ac-
tion to coordinate with others to find an empty project
part, and then uses her second action to add a contribu-
tion to the empty part, moving it to the finished state. In
this case, she contributes exactly one part to the project.
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Figure 6: Predicted amount of coordination by the model.
Heat maps show the amount of coordination (β) that opti-
mizes the number of finished parts of a project withE work-
ers and N parts.
• Not Coordinate: If the user does not coordinate, then
she uses both of her actions to sequentially contribute to
two randomly selected project parts. Either of these parts
might turn out to be finished, in which case the contribu-
tion has no effect (with probability 1 − α) or returns the
part in question to the unfinished state with probability α.
Each user chooses to coordinate independently with prob-
ability β and to not coordinate with probability 1−β, where
β is fixed in the beginning of the process. The two actions
allowed to users in the model represent the ability that users
in decentralized collaboration platforms have to spend all
the effort contributing to the projects, or to split their efforts
between contributing and coordinating. For example, as we
observed, some editors justify their edits in the discussion
page and some propose their edits before applying them to
the article. Likewise, some GitHub users explain their code
after committing it.
Collectively, the set of users would like the project to have
as many finished parts as possible. How much should they
coordinate in order to maximize this objective? We are in-
terested in finding the value of β that maximizes the number
of finished parts by the end of the process.
Figure 6(a) depicts the optimal β with N parts, E users,
and with α = 1. It is drawn as a heat map, with the color
corresponding to the value of β. Here β has been optimized
by running a large number of simulations of the process. We
observe first of all from the heat map that the relationship be-
tween crowdedness and coordination in this synthetic model
follows the same qualitative direction that we observed for
both Wikipedia and Github. We now turn to an analytical ap-
proximation of the optimal β and show it agrees very closely
with the simulation results.
Analysis of optimal coordination probability Fix N , E,
and α, and let Pi be the expected number of finished parts
the project has after i users have passed through the project.
Also, let XC,k be the probability that a user who does not
coordinate finishes k parts given that there are C finished
parts at the time the user arrives. When k < 0, XC,k is the
probability that the user will undo k parts from the project.
We make the following approximation:
Pi+1 = (1−β)(Pi+2XPi,2+XPi,1−XPi,−1−2XPi,−2)+β
(1)
Note that this is an approximation since the exact value of
Pi+1 is (1−β)(Ci+2XCi,2+XCi,1−XCi,−1−2XCi,−2)+
β, where Ci is the actual number of finished parts after user
i, not the expected value of Ci. That is, we make the deter-
ministic approximation that Ci is always its expected value.
Writing the values of XC,k in terms of α, C, and N and
plugging them into equation 1, we get the following recur-
rence relation:
Pi+1 = APi + P0
where A =
1− β
N2
(1 + α)2 − 21− β
N
(1 + α) + 1
and P0 = −1− β
N
(1 + α) + 2− β
(2)
Solving the recurrence, we get a closed form solution:
Pi = P0
[
Ai − 1
A− 1
]
if A 6= 1
and Pi = iP0 if A = 1
(3)
For fixed N , α, and E, PE in equation 3 gives the ex-
pected number of completed parts as a univariate function
of β. We can easily optimize this function and solve for the
value of β that leads to the most completed parts. Figure
6(b) shows the optimal value of β for a range of values of N
and E and α = 1. We observe that the result from the simu-
lations (figure 6(a)) and the analytical approximation (6(b))
are very similar, suggesting that both approaches lead to a
good approximation of the optimal solution.
We notice first that when E > N the best β is 1, for
the simple reason that in this case, if all users coordinate,
they will finish all the parts – the best possible outcome.
Conversely, when N is very large and E is small then the
best β is close to zero. That is because there are many more
parts than users, so it is unlikely for users to collide, and
hence coordinating is mainly wasteful. In between these two
extremes, there are values of N and E in which the best
value for β lies non-trivially away from both zero and one.
In the previous analysis we set α = 1. We now show that
the high level predictions of the model hold for any value of
α. Figure 6(c) shows the optimal β for a range of value of
N and E using α = 0. We observe that the area where the
optimal value of β is strictly between 0 and 1 rotates clock-
wise and there is overall less coordination. However, the ba-
sic trend observed when α = 1 holds here too — projects
require more coordination when the number of project parts
is smaller relative to the number of users. Analogous plots
across various values of α between 0 and 1 exhibit the same
general trends. For all α the model thus makes a basic quali-
tative prediction: users should coordinate more as the project
becomes more “crowded,” with E large relative to N . The
alignment of this stylized model with our hypothesis and
the trends we observed in Wikipedia and GitHub suggests
the potential robustness of the relationship between crowd-
edness and coordination in other collaborative domains. It
is striking that this relationship emerges clearly from the
model, despite the fact that crowdedness was not explicitly
built into the model’s structure.
Discussion
Through the use of rich datasets and a theoretical model
of coordination, we have analyzed the performance of on-
line projects from the perspective of coordination mecha-
nisms. On both Wikipedia and GitHub, we find that projects
with high status and visibility differ in aggregate from other
projects in the way that they use coordination. We also find
that crowding of project participants is a key parameter un-
derlying the coordination level in Wikipedia and GitHub. We
develop a theoretical model for the coordination process; the
analysis of the model aligns with the trends found in the
data, suggesting the potential robustness of the findings.
The relationship between coordination and these struc-
tural properties of projects can suggest principles for design-
ing coordination mechanisms in several dimensions.
• The relationship between crowdedness and coordination
suggests that coordination mechanisms should not be sur-
faced uniformly across different projects, but instead em-
phasized more strongly on crowded projects – those with
many team members relative to the project’s size.
• In a related vein, our analysis has pointed to differences
between lightweight and heavyweight coordination mech-
anisms, especially in their differential usage across active
and peripheral team members. There is thus a need to in-
tegrate these different coordination styles across different
types of contributors.
• Featuring and visibility interact in subtle ways with co-
ordination, as we have seen; there may also be additional
dimensions along which coordination should most effec-
tively be varied.
Broadly speaking, our framework here suggests that an un-
derstanding of the roles of coordination mechanisms in dif-
ferent settings can benefit from a data-oriented analysis of
their inherent trade-offs.
The similarities in these effects across both Wikipedia and
GitHub suggests some of their generality; it will be interest-
ing to consider how these findings carry over to other on-
line domains in which decentralized teams collaborate on
projects. As we have seen from the two domains in this pa-
per, the basic ingredients of our model and analysis can usu-
ally be directly adapted to new settings, since the framework
can be applied whenever there is a group faced with a pri-
mary work product and a separate channel for exchanging
coordination-related messages. Ultimately, seeing how these
findings transfer across domains will be a next useful step on
the way toward understanding the process of large-scale on-
line collaboration.
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Appendix: Sampling Wikipedia Articles
In this appendix we describe the sampling of featured and
non-featured Wikipedia articles in more detail. Recall that
our goal here is to create, for each featured article, a compar-
ison set of non-featured articles that have roughly the same
number of edits at roughly the same periods of time.
Our procedure is as follows. For each article a, we let
eb(a, y) be the number of times a was edited before year
y. Similarly, we let ed(a, y) and ea(a, y) be the number of
times a was edited during and after year y. For each arti-
cle af featured in year y, we find k random non-featured
articles, La,k, that have approximately the same number of
edits as af during the years before and after y. That is,
for an article af featured during year y, the non-feature
article an can be in La,k if
|eb(af ,y)−eb(an,y)|
eb(af ,y)
< .05 and
|ea(af ,y)−ea(an,y)|
ea(af ,y)
< .05.
We aim to investigate the differences in the amount of co-
ordination between featured and non-featured articles that
are not a direct consequence of differences such as volumes
of edits. Hence, we also require that eb(af , y) < eb(an, y)
for an to be included in La,k. The results turn out to be the
same with and without this additional restriction. We choose
the article an from the set of all non-featured articles without
replacement. That is, the sets La,k are pairwise disjoint.
We define F to be the set of articles that have been fea-
tured on Wikipedia for which La,k in non-empty, and we
define NF = ∪a∈F {La,30}, the non-featured articles with
approximately the same number of edits as a featured arti-
cle during the years before and after the year the article was
featured. Throughout the paper we compare the sets F and
NF . We repeat the analysis with different choices of k and
find that the results are consistent for all moderate values of
k. We present the results for k = 30
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